By Professor David D. Chand © 2004

A paper presented at The Sudan Crossroads Conference sponsored by The JFK School of Government, Harvard University, and the Tufts University, School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass, March 11-12, 2004.

INTRODUCTION

The people of Sudan like any other people in the world have an inalienable right to democracy and whose government has an obligation to promote and depend on. The late British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill said, "democracy is not the best system in the world, but there is no other system to replace it." In the contemporary world, one of the obstacles of democracy is that it is often hindered or impeded by conflicts of political ideology, civil wars, and internal colonialism that create non-conducive conditions of practice. In normal political circumstances, adherence to democratic practice can be affected by intensity of ethnic and inter-ethnic fighting, religious extremism, and terrorism triggered by competition over available, scarce natural resources or raw materials. The African nation of Sudan combines both a tense war situation and ethnic and religious differences, which have occupied much of the debate on civil war.

In the case of Sudan, ethnic and religious complexity and dialectical class struggle has to be underscored as mind-boggling. Fifty-six ethnic groups have divided into 597 subgroups speaking more 115 languages and dialects. Islam and Judaic-Christian are the main faiths in Sudan. While the Arab-Muslim is predominantly Muslim, the non-Arab-Muslim Africans in the South are Judaic-Christian with traditional African religions still being practiced by large numbers of the population. Although religious and ethnic diversity are not atypical to Sudan, they are not absolutely the immediate causes of war. Religion and ethnicity, nevertheless, have been contributing destructive forces in fueling and igniting one of the longest and forgotten colonial wars in Africa. However, ethnicity and religion alone are not adequate or sufficient explications that could trigger such a treacherous war in Sudan and South Sudan in particular.

The North-South dividing lines have been a result of historical process of mutual hostility characterized by Arab-Muslim colonial domination perpetuated by Egypt, Libya, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Islamic world against the non –Arab-Muslim South. From 1955-72, 1983- to present, even before independence, and on-and-off ever since, the Arab-Muslim colonial war has been described by many scholars as a "civil war." While religion and ethnic tensions are being utilized as the conduits of the war, it is now time to emerge from this stratosphere and vicious cycle of myopic political, sociological, psychological, and philosophical abstraction. The immediate causes of the war have been lack of democratization, good governance, the rule of law, human rights protection, transparency, and accountability. The failure of democratic governance and development in Sudan since post-colonial era heralded political violence, genocide, declared jihad (Holy War) against non-Arab-Muslim citizens by the NIF regime in the South in 1989. Previous regimes, both the military junta and the partially elected, so-called democratic governments, also committed war crimes, genocide, atrocities, and other heinous crimes against humanity in the South.

Based on the research on "The Road to Self-Determination at least five major issues could be identified as the main causes of Africa’s longest brutal, chronic, and most forgotten "colonial war" in Africa. These issues are as follow: (1) lack of political power sharing; (2) lack of resources or wealth sharing; (3) gross unequal socioeconomic development; (4) lack of democratization, good governance, and the rule of law; (5) human rights protection; (6) lack of access, transparency, comprehensiveness, and inclusiveness of Southerners (including the people from the periphery and marginalized areas in both North and South); and (7) extreme religious intolerance and Shari’ a laws (Islamic laws) enacted against freedom of worship. Furthermore, social and political freedoms have been suppressed through the superimposition of the harsh Shari’ a laws and other Draconian-Praetorian-Machiavellian laws in the country. If we were to sum up all of the above, we could conclude that lack of "promoting democratic governance" is the most important single factor. As a result, the country is divided into two classifications, one being "Arab-Muslim" and the other being "African-Judaic-Christian" population or the Afro-Arab Sudanese counterpart. The Arab population by virtue of power control and the identification of being Arab-Muslim has been privileged more than the non-Arab-Muslim Sudanese in the southern part of the country.

Since the assumption of political power control in the post-de-colonization era, the Arab-Muslim north assumed the title of "Awallad Al-Ballad" (sons of the land). In short, lack of democratic governance and all its values that government derived its just-rights from the people, the governors are supposedly to be servants of the governed, and no government can attempt to remove such basic rights endowed to all genders by their Creator without resistance has been non-existent in the country. The ruling power elites in Sudan compared to their counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa have failed to institutionalize democratic governance in the aftermath of de-colonization era. They became the neocolonial masters and denied the right of citizens to participate in the affairs of the state. The national euphoria nurtured by the power elites to develop Sudan for Sudanese has failed miserably. Furthermore, unequal development and power sharing have fueled the North-South colonial war. The Arab-Muslim north has been relatively developed economically and educationally whereas the South lagged behind in all endeavors. This is due to the fact that the South has been so engaged in the war of national liberation for over four decades (1955-72) and from 1983 to present. It has lost in education, infrastructure, civil administration, healthcare services, socioeconomic development planning, and strategic management.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The democratic governance has three waves in the Sudan. First, a democratic election was announced in 1953, just a few days after the promulgation of the self-government statue. Sudanese for organized the election over a month (11-02 to 12-10, 1953). It was declared by the Election Commission to have been peaceful, fair, and free although some complaints reported "corrupt practices." All the political parties participating in the election won their seats. The Constituent Assembly's great achievements were the 1953-55 elections, the establishment of Parliament, the approval of the Transitional Constitution, and the December 31, 1955, declaration of Sudan’s Independence Day of January 1, 1956. One of the major tasks of the new independent Sudanese state was to develop a homegrown parliamentary constitution capable of accommodating the aspirations and expectations of its cultural, religious, ethnic diversity, and socioeconomic development. The parliament failed, despite the pledge it made to the South on Independence Deliberations on December 19, 1955, that Federalism between North and South would be "given duly full consideration" at post-independence on January 1, 1956. This was the basis on which the southern bloc voted for independence as scheduled.

For the record, Sudan’s first national government was a Westminster-style or multiparty democratic system. The Prime Minister (PM) could have a vote of no confidence and national issues were be debated freely and without reprisals or fear of prejudice. All parties were freed to form coalitions. According to Professor M.A. Mohamed Salih, three important lessons could be drawn. First, the Sudanese political elite continued with their wrangling over office and prestige, often at the expense of pressing national issues. They failed to prove to the public that they were trustworthy than their colonial administrators were. Their public impression was that they were disorganized and careless about public policy rather than for consolidating their own power position. Second, political proliferation and the newly created political parties of the conventional traditional political parties transcended the sectarianism of the political parties they rejected in the first place. As result, there was always political vacuum, repeating a vicious cycle in this political theater. Third, the military extension had become a norm.

In Sudan, a graduate of Sudan Military Academy is more esteemed and valued compared to liberal arts, law, economics, political science, and medicine from University or college graduates. Because of prestige accorded to military, Sudan is one of the countries with more generals compared only to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The military has ruled the country for 36 years more than the civilian governments. As the Umma Party had invited the army to take power in 1958, so did the National Islamic Front (Al-Jabhah Al-Akawan Al-Muslimeen). These three lessons are indicative that Sudan's political power elites sown the seeds of democratic failure during the first decades of independence, and have continued to harvest the agony of their own creation. The military, of course, has been regarded as one of the elitist outfits was often deployed to impede the process of democratic governance in the country.

The third wave of the democratic peril in Sudan began with military coup d’etat of Mahli- Al- Fariq (Lt.-General) Ibrahim Aboud (1958-1964). The ragtag military junta brought about political stability in the North through the barrel of a gun with success and the highest level of economic prosperity ever experienced by Sudanese since independence. However, the military junta drastically suppressed democratic freedoms, speech, equality, social justice, and the civil society organization (CSO) by banning political organizations, trade unions, strikes, and freedom of speech and the press, and indefinitely suspended the constitution. Professor Peter Bechtold argues:

"The capriciousness of the party politics in 1958 was distasteful enough for the majority of the ordinary Sudanese. However, when it became compounded by economic reversals, the atmosphere was from distasteful to unbearable. Foreign exchange reserves had dwindled from 62 million Pounds Sterling to million, and the balance of trade continued in a negative spiral with no relief in sight following poor cotton harvest. Import restrictions on important consumer items added to the open grumbling; and soon public demonstrations ensued. The lack of systematic management and public order was patently clear and could not even be ignored by well-disciplined military.

In summation, the Aboud’s era was the civilian mistrust of the military manifested itself by popular refusal to give credit to the military for the accomplished economic progress. The aim of the Umma Party to instigate the military to take over power was because Southerners formed a strong coalition with other parties in Parliament and called for the creation of a "federal system" pledged before independence that would be decentralized political power and bring government closer to the people. The coup was also legit because Umma Party, having lost its coalition, lacked popular support to defend Sudan’s fragile democracy. Holt and Daly summarized the specific rasion d-etre for the military coup on November 17, 1958:

"By mid-1958 the position of the government was fast becoming intolerable. Deteriorating economic conditions were underlined by the obvious incapacity of the political parties to cope with them. Serious national issues (war in South Sudan) were seen to be subordinate to increasingly hectic maneuvers necessitated by the unworkable Umma-Peoples Democratic Party. Political mechanizations reached a finale in the late summer when the Umma leadership began actively to explore the possibility of coalition with PM Azhari’s National Unionist Party (NUP). This was complicated by reports of a possible Nationalist Unionist Party- Peoples Democratic Party alliance, which, if consummated, would remove the Umma power in yet another bizarre maneuver. Before any of these plans could be fulfilled, however, the army stepped in and swept away parties, politicians, and the parliamentary regime itself.

Another contentious issue that was not given national attention was the Southern political grievances by the military junta having ruled the country longer than their partially elected civilian governments. Thus, the rejection of the democratic governance in the country contradicted the pledge made to the Southerners before granting political independence "federation would be given duly full consideration." This ill wind blew across the country that the Arab-Muslim north could hardly chew and swallow and was in contrast to empty political promises the North failed to implement at the end of the day. It should be noted, herein, that the unresolved Southern Problem has been responsible for overthrowing most of the military regimes and partially elected democratic civil governments in the country. In essence, if South Sudan Problem is left strategically unresolved, the road to a comprehensive peace and conflict resolution remains grim. In other words, the South is the nightmare of the Arab-Muslim north compared to the United Arab Republic (UAR) involvement in the Yemeni conflict in the 1960s.

The Aboud military junta in the South was fighting an un-winnable colonial war in the Southern part of the country. Faced by so many hardships of war, deaths, hunger, and disease, the conclusion in accordance with Southern worldview was that the British colonialists departed and Arab-Muslim north colonialists replaced them. The administration, the army, the police, and all symbols of a foreign occupation force remained intact. The Aboud regime used systematic brutal force to achieve national integration and homogeneous state v. heterogeneous state with unity in diversity. The Aboud military junta stepped up its campaign of Arabization and Islamization, genocide, declared jihad and war of terror, nationalized parochial schools (which served as the kernel of Southern education since the colonial days), forced conversion to Islam, forced name changes from Afro- Judaic-Christian to Arab-Muslim names and so on. These policies included the promulgation of the Missionary Societies Act of 1962 and the immediate and unconditional expulsion of Foreign Christian Missionaries from Southern Sudan.

By October 1964, as result of internal contradictions, systemic paralysis, socio-economic problems, and the dying of young Northerners in the bushes of South Sudan, were mustered and culminated to toppling the junta by unarmed civilians and the first of its kind in Africa. A Transitional Government or a Caretaker Government was formed to prepare the banned political parties to re-enter political life after years of suspension. In 1965, the second national elections since independence were held and the NUP-Umma coalition, with Mohamed Ahmed Magoub, a labor lawyer by profession, became the Prime Minister. The coalition had a one-year life spanned. In 1966, Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi the Oxford educated Grandson of Al-Mahdi, was sworn in as the youngest Prime Minister. In summation, the period between 1965-68 was the worst in Sudan’s experiences with Parliamentary democracy. The South was not involved because it was engaged in fighting the colonial forces of occupation. Therefore, it did not matter who is on the saddle or in control in the North, it was meaningless to the South because the power was intended to be used with impunity against the South represented by the same Arab-Muslim colonial hegemony over the non-Arab-Muslim African Sudanese in the southern part of the country.

FROM SOCIALISM TO ISLAM

The then colonel Gaffer Mohamed El-Nuiemri, leader of the Free Officers Movement within the army, led the 1969 May Revolution. Two world’s great ideological conflicts, socialism v. Islamism, marred the Nuiemri era. Colonel Nuiemmri, a prominent ardent socialist until the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), engineered the coup against him in July 1971. The regime association with the communist was unfortunately disrupted in dismay. Thereafter, the Nuiemri’s economic policies were influenced by the brand of Arab socialism developed by the late President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt with its strong central planning and the state ownership of the modes of production. Politically, Nuimeri’s aim was to eliminate the influence of sectarian political parties. To achieve this goal, Numieri chose to create an autocratic one-party state under the political banner or guidance of the ‘Sudanese Socialist Union’ (SSU), a union of working people, (farmers, workers, professionals, intellectuals, and the army).

Whilst El-Nuimeri was moving the country towards one secular socialist identity, a combination of sectarian political parties (Umma and Democratic Nationalist Unionist Party) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) were not going to stand idle while their political foundation was being dismantled by the SSU. They organized themselves under the umbrella of the National Front, a marriage of convenience, with aim of overthrowing the Nuimeri’s regime as its main objective. The National Islamic Front was able to organize several demonstrations and staged series of abortive military coups. The most serious of these was the 1976 coup attempt, supported by more than 3,000-strong National Front Forces (NFF) from their military bases in Libya. The post-1976 attempted assassinations were heralded by reconciliatory polices with the National Front opponents. In 1977, the May Revolution reconciled with National Front leaders and signed an agreement on several issues that the opposition would be re-admitted to political life in return for dissolution of National Front. Additionally, there would be restoration of civil liberties; the freeing of all prisoners; reaffirmation of Sudan’s nonaligned foreign policy; and a promise to reform local government. The SSU, in fear of being overthrown, brokered a deal with the National Front leaders, including Al-Sadiq al- Mahdi and his brother-in-law Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi. Dr. Al-Turabi was appointed Rai Al-A’am (the Attorney–General) (AG) under whose advice Nuimeri introduced Shari’ a laws, otherwise known as the September 1983 laws. Al-Sadiq became a member of the Central Committee of the SSU.

Perhaps, Nuimeri’s great triumph during his first decade in power was the Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 that temporarily ended the 17-year war. The Addis-Ababa Accord produced relative peace and granted the South local autonomy within a United Socialist Sudan. The South was ruled under the Regional Self-Government Act of 1972 for the Southern Provinces until the promulgation of the Regional Government Act of 1983. In order to critically and analytically analyze what went wrong with Nuimeri’s socialist rhetoric to Islam came in September 1983, when suddenly Nuiemeri superimposed Shari’ a laws and declared the country an Islamic State. He was ill advised or dubbed by Dr.Al-Turabi as an alternative to overthrowing Nuimeri. Most importantly, the North-South colonial, racial, and Islamic apartheid was not resolved, but temporarily reduced, between 1972-83 when President Nuiemeri accommodated the Southern grievances under the Articles and Provisions of Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972. Following the introduction of September 1983 laws, El-Nuiemeri unilaterally dissolved the High Executive Council (HEC) in the South, re-divided the South into three autonomous regions under the old adage of divide and conquer because the Southern leadership reached a political cull de sac.

Realistically, there was a strong power struggle among southerners because of lack of cohesive and clearly defined coherent southern nationalism. The re-division of the south emerged as a result of bitter political struggle between Mr. Abel Aleir and Bor-Dinka Mafioso, and the former SSLM leader General Joseph Lago (ret.) that culminated to the rise of the Kokora. The abrogation of the Addis-Ababa Accord and the introduction of Shari’ a laws in September 1983 precipitated the war. The discovery of oil in Bentiu Western Nuerland and throughout the Nuerland in the Greater Upper Nile Region prompted President Nuiemeri to change course. The following were identified as the causes of Nuiemri’s unilateral action in the South: (1) the government's tight policy on newly discovered oil and other strategic critical raw materials in the South; (2) the premature construction of the controversial Jonglei Canal without any adequate feasibility studies to measure its short and long terms adverse impact on Nuer and Dinka population and their traditional way of life as cattle grazers or horticulturists; (3) the endangering of wildlife species in Sudd (marshes) because of expected drainage of the Sudd and ecological environment; and (4) the construction of the newly proposed National Oil Refinery (NOR) in Unity State (Al-Walaya Al-Wahda).

DEMOCRATICIZING POLITICAL ISLAM

The third wave of democratic crisis emerged when the National Islamic Front (NIF) assumed power via a military coup d’etat in June 1989. The question to probe is can Islam be democratized? To answer this question would require scholarly research. However, the purpose of this work is self-evident that Islam cannot be democratized. The religious and political structures have Al-Qur’aan and Shar’ia laws based on religious doctrine: Islam is a faith and the states are inseparable. Hence, it cannot permit the direct line of separation between state and religion. Although Turkey is predominantly Islamic but a non-Islamic state, there seems to be a struggle among the pro-Islamic forces and secularists as were shown in the last elections in Turkey. The Post-Taliban Afghanistan has adopted a democratic and post-Saddam Iraq is also expected to adopt a democratic constitution. These are great democratic moves. The question that we would be obliged to probe is that will they last? That’s the question to be or not to be that is the question. The adoption of democracy in these Islamic states is not absolute and likelihood that they could revert to Shari’a rule in the future because it is part and parcel of their culture. Because Islam means the total submission to the will of Allah, Muslim cannot embrace living in a secular state. In the aftermath of the signing of the Khartoum Peace Agreement, a Presidential Committee drafted an Islamic constitution (Al-Destur Al-Islamiyya) to democratize extreme political Islam that was approved by referendum and enacted in July 1998. The Basic Laws of the constitution guaranteed fundamental rights. Specifically, the constitution guaranteed freedom of association and organization as follows: Article 26 (1) and (2) have the Sudan Constitution of 1998 guarantees freedom of association and organization. Article of the 1998 constitution provides that the Court shall be competent to hear and determine any of the following: (a) interpretation of the Constitution when requested to do so by the President of the Republic (Islamic), the National Assembly, one-half of the Governors of the States or one-half of the State Assemblies; (b) suits from any aggrieved persons to protect the guarantees and rights guaranteed by the Constitution after exhausting the executive and administrative remedies available; (c) suits concerning jurisdiction conflicts between national and federal bodies; (d) criminal procedures against the President of the Republic and the Governors under the constitution or the law; (e) objections concerning the acts of the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, or National or Federal Ministers.

Promoting democratic and good governance represents peace; freedom; liberty; social justice; democratic system; democratic institutions, socioeconomic development; and democratic participation. Activities in this area include (1) supporting participation and broad-based constitutional review and reforms; (2) strengthening the capacity of political parties and civil society organizations; (3) empowering women through initiative that help them reach positions of political leadership and gain access to legislative deliberations; (4) promotion of sustainable human development in legislative deliberation; (5) strengthening the internal engagement in legislatures; and (6) training of Parliamentary members and staff. On the contrary, the lack of democratic governance yields to dictatorship, suppression of basic freedoms, denial of political participation, and disappearances of prominent individuals, rebellion, civil wars, and the quest for the exercise of the right of self-determination. Referring to an earlier analogy, the North-South divides is a consequence of colonial legacy and lack of promoting good democratic governance. Modern Sudanese state is an artificial creation of the colonial era during the scramble for Africa in the 1900's.

There were two distinct administrations between North and South. The North was governed under the pattern of British colonial administration in Egypt and the Middle East and the South was ruled under the indirect rule like any other British colony in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country had a long positive experience of multiparty democracy before independence. In the post-colonial era, Sudanese power elites were modernist in attitude and actions. Lack of promoting democratic governance in Sudan resorted to the country drifting into various forms of authoritarian rule that created a vicious cycle of semi-democratic-military governments. In Sudan, since post-colonial era, it was not a multiparty participatory democracy. Becks and Habermas write, "The call for democracy is therefore structured around regimes of truth premised on a legitimate crisis rather than on people’s aspirations." M.V. Van Baarsen writes, "Ethno-cultural differences are just as great." Sudan’s almost 30 million inhabitants may be tentatively divided into an Arabized and Islamicized population inhabiting the North, and a Southern-based African population adhering to traditional religions and Christianity.

Based on the 1956 report by the special commission that investigated the Southern Sudan disturbances on August 15, 1955, concluded on the North-South dichotomy:

1. There is very little in common between Northern and Southern Sudanese. Racially, religiously, and linguistically, the north is Arab-Muslim and speaks Arabic language and the South is Negroid and Judeo-Christian or followers of African and speaks over 80 tongues. Of course, the aforementioned distinctions delineated geographical, historical, and cultural differences.

2. For historical reasons, southerners regard the Arab-Muslim Northerners as their mortal enemies. This belief could be traced to the period of slave raiders and slave trade in the South with the exception of a few areas.

3. Until 1947, The British Administration colonial policy was designed to let southerners progress on African and Negroid lines"… and by promulgation of the "Closed District" policy and the Permits to Trade Ordinance Acts, limited any interaction or intermingling between the predominantly Arab-Muslim North and the non-Arab-Muslim South.

3. The British colonial administration relatively developed the Arab-Muslim north compared to the predominantly African South. As a result, political, financial, and economic development, the Arab-Muslim north was relatively developed and progressed rapidly in every field such as local government, health, irrigation schemes, and education whereas, the south lagged or trailed far behind. Succinctly, the backwardness of the South was due to pigmentation and racial discrimination imposed against the darker skinned people worldwide up to this day and in Africa in particular.

5. As a result of these acute, parallel, and irreconcilable differences, Sudanese folks have not been treated as equal partners in the national building, nationalism, and patriotism of this fragile and war-ravaged African nation of Sudan.

The commission on findings was accurate and should be treated as such as the foundation of the North-South conflict. Legally and politically, based on the precede five points conclusion of the special commission, the North-South divides could no longer be described as a "civil war" but rather as a "colonial war". Hence, the armed struggle over decades in the international community has been ignored and cost the South so much it has demanded the right of self-determination, including the establishment of an independent and sovereign nation-state in South Sudan and total eradication of colonialism foreign and inland in all its forms.

DEFINITION OF SOUTH SUDAN

South Sudan constitutes the former three Southern Provinces of Bhar-el-Ghazel, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, which now comprises of the ten southern states whose political and geographical boundaries were demarcated in 1937 and remain since independence on January 1, 1956. This definition has been accepted by the parties to the conflict namely, South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM/A), Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF), SPLA-Torit faction, SPLA-United, South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), through the Intergovernmental Authority and Development (IGAD) Declaration of Principle (DOP) in May 1994. For practical and legal reasons, the three areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile are being contested by the SPLA and are not part of the South. They are part and parcel of the Arab-Muslim North. Hence, any claims to these territories would be extra-territorial claims, neocolonialism, and unrealistic.

SUDANIZATION POLICY 1953-55

Retrospect to Sudanization policy (1953-55), of the 1,200-2,000 senior level posts occupied by expatriates and scheduled to be Sudanized, only six of the junior category were allocated to the South. The Arab-Muslim north monopolized all most all of the positions. The monopoly of political power by the Arab-Muslim north could be cited as the root cause of political dissatisfaction and rebellion by the then Southern Corps in the Garrison town of Torit on August 18, 1955. The measurements deployed by the Arab-Muslim north were that the South lacked qualified persons and non-Muslims. In accordance with Shari’ a Al-Islamiyya, (Islamic laws) that postulates, "Non-Muslims (infidel) cannot rule Muslims." As a result of this neo-colonial mentality, it contributed to and was responsible for the "colonial war," otherwise described as a "civil war" by many scholars and experts in South Sudan from 1955-1972. It lulled the defunct Addis-Ababa Accord brokered in 1972, which granted the South local autonomy or internal self-rule within a United Socialist Sudan. The issues of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Southern were not part and parcel of the South. The inclusion of the said into South Sudan equation by the SPLA is extraterritorial and extra-juridical. In the post-de-colonization era, the North failed to create a political balance with the South, including the peripheral, marginalized, and backward areas in the North such as the Nuba Mountains, the Beja, and Southern Blue Nile (Ignessena Hills). Other causes of the war are lack of resources or wealth sharing; gross socioeconomic underdevelopment; persistent denied access to the sociopolitical and economic mainstream and religious fervors (though this was kept subtle); the political ambition of the Arab-Muslim north establishment to create an Islamic state in which its Umma (masses) shall be Arabized and Islamized, including the non-Arabized-Islamized Southerners. This is a uniform political and philosophical belief among all Northerners, including the National Democratic Alliance (NODE) in opposition against the NIF regime in Khartoum. Perhaps, another sociological problem that affects some Northerners, whether Western educated and Westernized assimilated or not, is the problem of Al-Sudaniyaa (Sudanism) versus Al-Arabiyaah (Arabism). Many Northerners feel proud to be called Arabs rather than Sudanese or African. They look down on African people and culture as being inferior, un-Arab and un-Islamic, or term it as Abid (slaves) cultures. As a result, it has created situations of ‘identity crisis’ and ‘inferiority complex’ enormously contributing to the war and the demand for the right of self-determination by the South.

The monopoly of power by one group against another constitutes the absence of democratic governance in Sudan. According to M. A. Salih, the British rather than being seen as an equal partner in the process of nation building often treated the South as "colonial area" bequeathed to the Arab-Muslim north. This work has identified four (4) contentious issues as the causes of war between North-South dividing lines. First, there is monopoly of political power, resources or wealth and other vital instruments of the state by the North. This issue of boundary resources and trans-boundary resources should be cited to be a primary objective that the Arab-Muslim north has always resisted Southern departure and the later has been endowed with natural resource wealth and oil resources, fertile agricultural land, and abandon water supplies of the Sudd (marshes) and one of the world’s longest rivers, the great Nile River. The discovery and development of oil by the Talisman Energy, INC. of Canada, Chinese National Petroleum Company (CPC, Malaysia (PETRONAS) and the Arab Sheiks investments have adversely complicated the search for peace and conflict resolution. Thus, any durable peace deal would require oil revenue sharing, including none-oil products such as cotton revenue from the Al-Gezira Scheme. The discovery in the Nuerland and development of oil in Western Nuerland in 1978 and throughout the Nuer nation in Greater Upper Nile could be a "blessing" or a "curse" in disguise. We should look at this point of view in two perspectives: "blessing" the development of oil could make the Nuer nation strong and its courageous people to be the richest in Africa. Their lives could be altered forever by the wealth that could accumulated from the oil revenue on the one hand and could be a "curse" on the other because it could bring the self-destruction of the Nuer nation and occupation by the expatriates and the neighbors.

Second, there is unequal development. Most of the socioeconomic development has been concentrated in the North particularly in Al-Gezira Scheme. The South, despite its potential to be one of the richest areas of Sudan, has been left underdeveloped and has been used as sources for cheap labor. Unless there will be political will and sound leadership to change things around, the future of unity in diversity, democratic pluralism, good democratic governance, and human rights protection, transparency and accountability remains grim. At this juncture, the South will no longer accept the status quo of being permanently relegated into the position of a second-class entity or to be let go to fan out for itself as an independent and sovereign state. Third, there has been grossly denied access of highly qualified southerners into the bureaucratic, political and economic mainstream. Fourth, lack of democratic governance and right of self-determination. Self-determination by definition has two dimensions, namely, the right to establish an independent and sovereign state by legal means and the other, of course, it calls only for the granting of cultural rights and falls short of establishing a state. This dimension assures only the creation of federalism within the established de jure political boundaries of the state.

While Southerners and the international community constantly blamed the Arab-Muslim north on all the problems in the country, it should also be equally fair to share blame with the South on its own "merit and meritocracy." Southern nationalism as I see it has been built and nurtured on the premise of tribal or ethnic lineages and its primordial identifications compared to the Arab-Muslim north unified by Islam. It’s true that Southerners have been the victims of the Arab-Muslim north colonial domination, plundering, looting, slavery, forced Arabization and Islamization, social and racial discrimination, internal displacement, declared jihad since 1989, and a scourged of the Earth policy practiced by Al-Mujhadeen from different Islamic radical and extremist groups in the middle East, Egypt, Pakistan, Kashmir, Taliban (Student) from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia as well as the Nation of Islam in the United States of America have fought jihad against the "infidels" and the arch enemies of Islam in Sudan. The post-Addis-Ababa of 1972-83 political developments were clear indicators that Southerners themselves are not adequately prepared to formulate the process of democratic governance in a would-be independent and sovereign South. There were sharp internal, political, and ideological differences, which culminated to the re-division of the South into three autonomous regions. The Equatorians and other minority groups complained that the Nilotic majority has dominated the reigns of power in the South as such demanded their lion share in the national cake. Mr. Steve Wondu, SPLM Representative in Washington, DC, USA, has recently remarked somewhat sarcastically the complaint that Dr. Garang "will load the government with the Dinka and the Nuer will trigger to fight everyone and kill at random." In the Marxist-Leninist SPLA, the same episode and experience of post-Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 reoccurred. Many people were assassinated, marginalized, alienated, murdered, genocide, and enslaved. This was one of the major facts that led to the split in the movement in 1991. Although the primary causes of the split were centered on the lack of coherent objective, lack of democratization, good governance, human rights protection, transparency and accountability, the issue of inclusion in the decision-making in the movement could not be ruled out as having frustrated and disguised many individuals in the movement.

Given my firsthand knowledge and experience in the peacemaking process as a former prime negotiator and one of the framers of the internationally recognized document known as the Intergovernmental Authority and Development Declaration of Principles [IGAD/DoP] in May 1994, it is that which now serves as the basis for a negotiated conflict resolution in Sudan. Additionally, I have been a prime negotiator with the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime delegation through the IGAD peace process and other media worldwide sponsored by the Intergovernmental Partners Forum (IF), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United States of America (USA) to narrow the gap between the warring camps in Sudanese War from 1994-1995. Moreover, I was also one of the negotiators and drafters of the Political Charter of April 1996 that served as a prelude to the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) of April 21, 1997.

My specific intention of presenting this work is to educate the public in the search that is needed for democratization, good governance, good public policy decision-making, and to warn the sponsors about the flaws contained in the ongoing bilateral talks between the NIF regime lead by Lt.-General Hassan Omer Al-Bashir and the SPLM lead by the demonic Dinka dictator, Dr. John Garang. Both parties are "autocratic movements" and lack the capacity to provide leadership if they are not properly checked out and could plunge the country into a deadly war with serious consequences ahead for the people of Sudan and South Sudan in particular. Both the NIF regime and the SPLM are dictatorships, not democratic, who are politically unreliable and legally incompetent to produce any real peace for the country. Both are autocratic movements who have been privileged as result of external pressures to utilize the platform for their own socio-political and economic self-glorifications to maintaining power illegally and undemocratically. The international community should know and understand that they have neither the mandate nor the approval to be spokespersons for the people of Sudan both north and south alike. They have neither the ability to neither make peace nor keep the peace.

Most importantly, both lack the capacity to rest assure the peace because the ongoing talks are not transparent, comprehensive, and inclusive. Based on the above, they have deliberately and willfully excluded and disenfranchised an overwhelming majority of the political forces, armed and unarmed groups in both North and South alike. The sponsors of the ongoing bilateral peace talks, mainly the US, the UK, Norway, and Italy, should have first considered certain prerequisites before starting any negotiations. Namely and first of all, the parties to the conflict should have declared a universal truce. Secondly, South-South Dialogue should have been a prerequisite and given top priority. Thirdly, all armed and unarmed groups should have been invited to the talks. Without a shadow of doubt, South Sudanese have been divided due to bad leadership, ethnic hegemonic tendencies, systematic human rights abuses, war crimes, genocide, cannibalism, slavery, massacres, atrocities and other crimes against humanity committed by the Marxist-Leninist SPLA abated by the former Marxist Colonel Mengistu Haile Miriam of Ethiopia between 1983 and 1994. Fourth, the international sponsors should apply the democratic principles by enfranchising all groups as equal in the South before the law of international negotiations, mediation, and arbitration. Thus, favoritism of only one party and trying to superimpose it on others against their free will and consent could back fire sooner or later. Because of anti-SPLM/A leadership in the South under Mr. John Garang, the likelihood of unity would be impractical, if not impossible, to materialize in the South.

Furthermore, if the noble intentions of the international sponsors are to achieve a durable peace and to promote democratic governance, there is a great need for South-South Dialogue, reconciliation, ‘unity of purpose’ among equals, and the resolution of several basic fundamental issues that led to the split on August 28, 1991.The course of the split was Lack of coherent objective in the movement, democratization, good governance, the rule of law, human rights protection, transparency and accountability in the SPLA. South-South Dialogue would facilitate southerners to share power, wealth, and the creation of an international tribunal for war crimes, Truce and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Southerners to confess the wrong deeds they have done, which they ought not to have done against each other since the inception of the SPLA and in the aftermath of the split. Most importantly, it will be forum to strategize national unity, federalism, decentralization, and national integration. In short, Mr. Garang and his cronies have autocratically and undemocratically hijacked and managed the movement as if it was their own personal plantation. Without conciliation of the above concerns, the road to peace in Sudan and South Sudan in particular remains grim.

The SPLM, known for its poor quality leadership, is not fit to govern the South alone. It does not have the system of Civil Administration (CA). It has to equally share political power, resources or wealth, socioeconomic development with other parties, and provide access and equal opportunity for all citizens based on ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’. Let’s assume that the SPLA wanted to share power, resources, and security arrangements with the predominantly Arab-Muslim north. It should also be equally reasonable for the SPLA to share power with other political parties in the South. With all due respect, the SPLA is a political party like any other political parties in the South that should not bully any Southerners to join or not because it is not the national government of the South. Any "exclusion" or "marginalization" of anyone by the SPLM of power, access to the mainstream, hunger, or disease could ultimately yield to a bloody confrontations or clashes at the end of the day. Reckoning, the historiography of the SPLM, it is not a democratic outfit, and lacks democratic institutions that could possibly promote democratic governance in the South. However, with mergence with the SPDF, tremendous radical democratic reforms have been made. Thus, the old SPLM/A establishment is now crumbling and ready to fall apart. We look forward to new democratic and just South wherefore all southerners shall treated equal, and to each according to ability based on merit and meritocracy.

The survival and unity of South Sudan would require certain issues to be addressed as the political instruments for achieving democratic governance: written Transitional Democratic Constitution (TNG), formation of a flexible federal system, and democratically elected TNG of national unity based on secret ballet of one man/woman vote and one value. Failure on the part of sponsors to adhere to these proposals at the start could cause everything to tumble. Thus, creating the possibility of rebellion, war, and national disintegration in South Sudan. Having said that, reckoning that the SPLM lack democratic structures, a good system of governance, civil administration, and of checks and balances, transparency and accountability, this position does not, per se, indicate that the author or any Southerners who are not a members of the SPLA as a party, should not be classified as war mongrels or anti-system. An anecdote we are obliged to illustrate for historical record is that Mr. Garang per se, did not form the SPLA. The founding fathers of the then South Sudan Liberation Movement II (SSLM II), otherwise known as Anya-Any II (A-2), were General Gordon Koang Chuol, General Vincent Kuany Latjor, the Late charismatic Colonels Samuel Gai Tut and William Abdallah Choul Deng. In actual fact, it would be politically correct to underscore that Mr. John Garang hijacked the movement from its founding fathers whom he had murdered and assassinated with the help of his good friend the former pro-Marxist-Leninist Colonel Mengistu Haile Miriam who now resides under the political wings of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

Given, my firsthand knowledge and experience of the SPLA system and its military war machine, indoctrination and training, I feel that without political and constitutional safeguards, the likelihood of corruption, nepotism, favoritism, tribal hegemonic tendencies, monopoly of political power, wealth or resources, and human rights abuses are inevitable in greater magnitude. The sponsors of the current bilateral peace talks should be committed to contain the SPLM dictatorial rule in South Sudan. The people of South Sudan do not want to live under a communist dictatorship but rather under a democratic system in this millennium and beyond. The sponsors should also reckon that both the government and SPLA are "autocratic military movements" and any peace deal would not lead to the establishment of a democratic Sudan. Many Southern-armed groups who have fought the government as part of the SPLA before the split in 1991 have been deliberately excluded in participating in the Machakos Protocol of July 2002. This act, whether by submission or omission, is a problem by itself and could be a bloody struggle. In essence, the so-called "peace" is not peace, but rather a partnership between the SPLM and GOS or a deception similar to Addis- Ababa Accord of 1972 that was without any guarantees and could trigger a war between the SPLA and the armed groups who have been excluded from the peace process.

THE WEST WOES THE MARXIST SPLA

Certainly, the SPLM leader Mr. Garang, who has been wooed by the West with emphasis on Washington and Norway on in particular have been banking on a predatory dictator, but not a ‘democrat’. Politically, the guy has been inconsistent and has been acting like a ‘chameleon’ and a manipulator rather than a benevolent dictator. For instance, when the SPLM/A is in Egypt, he professes to be a pro-unionist. In Abuja, Nigeria for instance, he speaks of self-determination. In Washington DC, he tells the American the concept of "New Sudan". How can anyone trust this sort of a leader? The art of leadership requires undertaking tough and risky decision-making, boldness and being fair at all times. On a scale of one to ten, he is compared to Saddam Hussein of Iraq (1973-2003) and Pol Pot Khmer Rouge of Cambodia (1970s-80s). Based on the above mentioned, the SPLA leader could even be best described as the Pinochet of South Sudan. The Bush Administration should not be misinformed and misguided by the Washington lobbyists and the so-called experts on Sudan in this foreign policy endeavor. The Bush Administration should underscore that any political stumbling block or setback in Sudan could have adverse political impact and produce serious political implications for the Horn of Africa and with far reaching effects for US foreign policy in Africa. The US, the UK, Norway, and Italy should not attempt to install another dictator in South Sudan when these countries are committed to doing whatever is humanly possible to remove dictatorships in order to replace them with "liberal democracy" and to promote democratic governance in Afghanistan and Iraq.The sponsors should know that the current peace is pressured and externally superimposed peace that is divvying up Sudan’s territory and untapped riches without resolving its fundamental roots of the conflict—how to govern this African nation.

THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS

The lobbyists and experts on Africa should not deceive or misinform the Administration, Congress, and the people of the United States to create another Rwanda, Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone because the consequences of another inter-ethnic fight in South Sudan could have far dangerous results that could surpass the aftermath of the 1991 split. The European Union should press ahead with in collaboration with the USA in convening South-South Dialogue. The sponsors who have volunteered to organize the bilateral talks between the SPLA and the GOS should be put on notice to revisit their strategic plans before it is too late. In my viewpoint, as a South Sudanese intellectual that has been involved in the search for peace retrospect to 1994; it is imperative that the sponsors should not allow themselves to set off the political landmines in South Sudan. Moreover, the sponsors’ failure on the peace initiative to adhere to this frame of reference (worldview), it could lead to the creation of dangerous situations similar to Somalia from stateless to statelessness, Katanga Province in the Congo in the 1960s, including the recent political and armed conflicts in the Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone in South Sudan. It should stated at the on set that the sponsors of the peace initiative fail to gain transparent, comprehensive, and inclusive peace in Sudan, they should be held heretofore accountable.

A NATION AT WAR

The African nation of Sudan has been a nation at war against itself for more than four decades of prolonged Arab-Muslim "colonial war," terrorism, and political instability. The causes of the war in Sudan have two tiers, namely, Arab-Muslim north colonial rule, racialism and racism, and extreme religious apartheid. Finally, there is South-South and North-South colonial legacy similar to the reoccurring intractable African problems in the former British, French, and Portuguese colonies in the African continent. In order for the sponsors to resolve this chronic colonial war in Sudan, they should recognize that it requires delicate scientific and methodological approach. In the search for conflict resolution, the prerequisite should be first and foremost, to accept that the Arab-Muslim north and the non-Arab-Muslim South are distinct in their own impressions and lifestyle.

This point is congruent with the findings of the special commission that investigated the disturbances in South Sudan in 1955. Furthermore, it should also be accepted that both North and South could possibly form and co-exist as one heterogeneous state provided that it remains a ‘secular democratic’ state and promotes ‘democratic governance’. However, given the current political circumstances, it would be impractical, if not impossible, for North and South to co-exist as one state. The Sudan, therefore, should be "partitioned" into two independent and sovereign states, viz., one Arab-Muslim to be governed by Shari’a laws in the North and the other should be secular and democratic in the South. Thirdly, Sudan’s largest landmass Africa should be partitioned as the only viable and vibrant alternative conflict resolution. Because too many agreements have been brokered and dismantled in the past, there is likelihood that any peace agreement brokered through the Machakos Protocol could also be dishonored. Notwithstanding, all the previous agreements from Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 to the recently failed Khartoum Peace Agreement of April 1997 were not treated as "The Holy Qur’aan" and/or "The Holy Bible." Quite often, the architects of the peace agreements in the Arab-Muslim North could decide unilaterally and without any prior notice to dismantle it. As a result, this unpredictable political environment and atmosphere nurtures deep mistrust, skepticism, lack of high moral grounds, lack of political communications, and lack of confidence building measures.

THE TRAGEDY OF WAR

Many people from both sides have died in the war. Why do they have to die? Realistically, if all the dead were to be resurrected, it would be discovered that a population of a nation-state has been wiped out. If all the resources appropriated for the war were to be utilized for development, what a great development that would be! Historically, many peace agreements have been brokered and dismantled by the previous regimes, including the Khartoum Peace Agreement [KPA], otherwise known as the Sudan Peace Agreement of 1997, which has been incorporated into the 1998 Constitution under Articles 137 &138 by the NIF regime in 1998-2000. Although the KPA was dishonored by the NIF regime, the Machakos Protocol signed in July 2002 and current bilateral talks for the record are a "copycat" of the KPA. Neither the NIF regime nor the SPLA has contributed any new paradigms to the talks at Machakos and Navisha respectively. For the record, the KPA made tremendous successes and introduced a democratic change in the country and in the SPLA. The KPA was also superior quality agreement compared to the Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 because it registered clearly the right of self-determination as the ultimate main objective of the armed struggle against Arab-Muslim north colonialism and Islamic apartheid. The KPA has assured the South the following points:

• It puts the unity of Sudan on a litmus test through an internationally supervised referendum.
• It advocates unity based on political consensus, free will, and consent, equality, social justice, fraternity, and democracy rather than super imposition of values.
• It envisages an alternative solution for the establishment of an independent and sovereign state in the area traditionally, legally, historically, geographically, politically, and internationally recognized and defined as South Sudan. With it political boundaries demarcated in 1937 below the 12^th Parallel as they stood upon independence of January 1, 1956. Any areas, therefore, included outside the said domain, tantamount to extra-territorial and extra-juridical of South Sudan.
• It ensures that there is to be fair and free regional and international supervised referendums in the South to determine whether the people of the South desires unity-meaning, a federal system with the Arab-Muslim north or to opt for secession- meaning the establishment of an independent and sovereign state in the South minus Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Southern Blue Nile (Igessena Hills).
• The agreement guarantees all the usual freedoms of movement, assembly, political association, press, speech (in accordance with relevant international treaties), convents signed and ratified by the Government of Sudan (GOS).
• The agreement guarantees equitable sharing of resources or wealth, political power, development, access to socioeconomic mainstreams and religious freedom.

The KPA has recorded for the first time the exercise of right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan to determine their political destiny, socioeconomic, and cultural well being as well as the right to development. By virtue of that right, they can determine the right to establish their own nation-state, by legal means. It should be recognized that Dr. Machar and his KPA negotiating team should be complimented because the SPLA and its conspirators at last recognized that KPA was the right thing to do. At last, even those who claimed within the SPLA that the pro-Islamic NIF regime that is "deformed to be reformed" should not have entered into dialogue with a regime that is deformed and hard to be deformed on the basic fundamental principles of the KPA. Both the SPLA and the pro-Islamic NIF regime will be pressured in signing a piecemeal document for peace, but it will be neither "The Qur’aan" nor "The Holy Bible." At the end of the day however, any peace signed will have been dismantled through deception, fragmentation, and intransigence on the part of both parties who have been playing the cat and the mouse game with human lives and lies.

UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS

In fact, the failure of the KPA was contributed by the EU and the United States political, ideological, and foreign policy differences over Sudan. The United States of America held the NIF regime responsible for the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak, an ally of the United States in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1996. It was a culprit of exporting and spreading international Islamic fundamentalism, international terrorism, and the destabilization of the Horn of Africa. The US and Egypt lobbied hard through the international community and the United Nations Security Council to isolate the NIF regime. Both Egypt and the United States succeeded in imposing economic and trade sanctions against the NIF regime. All foreign assets were frozen except for the gum Arabic that is critical for the US food and pharmaceutical companies. After a long campaign by the NIF regime with support from most Afro-Arab countries, some EU member states, economic sanctions, trade and arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations were lifted against the NIF regime. The United States and Uganda abstained from the vote of lifting sanctions against Sudan. Even before lifting sanctions, the League of Arab States reconciled with Egypt and Sudan. Although the European Union (EU) was interested in supporting the Khartoum Peace Agreement it was also constrained by lack of unified foreign policy and united action. The French and the Germans had serious disagreements with the US over the isolation of the NIF regime. Such developments happened before they became viable at the UN Resolution 1441 on Iraq to comply with the UN Resolutions on inspections and disarmaments of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and including possible invasion of Iraq by the Coalition Forces under the command of the US and the UK on March 20, 2003.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The war in South Sudan has been described by many scholars as a "civil war," "ethnic or tribal warfare" and "religious warfare" between the predominantly Arab-Muslim north and the Judaic-Christian south in which the former seeks to superimpose itself on the latter. This characterization of the war is unreal. The first article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights reads, "All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The right of self-determination is the cardinal principle of the United Nations Charter. The UN Charter Article 1 (2) and Article 55 have reckoned with this legal and fundamental God’s given human right. The 1960 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People which, inter alia, stated that the Assembly:

"Declares that:

"1. The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

"2. All people have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.

"3. Inadequate political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

"4. All armed action or progressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent people shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected."

THE JURISDICIAL STATUS OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Self-determination poses a threat to the established order, therefore it can be considered as a form of self-assertion against any kind of domination. Before 1945, the right of self-determination had a vague legal interpretation. It was considered a concept of political morality rather than legal character. It was a concept inappropriate for legal analysis. It should be considered that self-determination had no legal standing until fairly recent times. Up to World War II its application by states lacked sufficient consistency to provide a body of practice on which its status as a legal right under international law could be based. Since 1945, international political developments in the United Nations, and the influence of the Afro-Asian nationalism and the former ‘Iron Curtain’ countries, have changed the position and many Western jurists now admit that self-determination is a legal principle. Professor Ian Brownlie writes "the present position is that self-determination is a legal principle, and that United Nations organs do not permit Article 2(7) to impede discussion and decision when the principle is in issue…." It should be added in the 1960 Declaration on the granting of independence that denial of self-determination is now widely regarded as a denial of human rights and as a fitting subject for the United Nation.

From the Southern point of view, the right of self-determination is a basic fundamental, legal, and human rights. Thus, the war is a "colonial war" to eradicate Arab-Muslim north colonialism in all its forms, Islamic apartheid, racialism and racism, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism supported by Egypt, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Islamic world. It has been going on in South Sudan as the last colonial war in the African continent. Western colonialism and apartheid in South Africa has been defeated. In the short run, Arab colonialism and Islamic apartheid in South Sudan shall too, be defeated.

Specifically, the war is the demand to exercise the right of self-determination as a God given right to "all people" on planet Earth to free themselves from any foreign or overland colonial domination externally superimposed on them against their free will and consent. In fact, almost all of the 193 or so member states of the United Nations attained their right of self-determination through armed struggle. The African experts, the Washington lobbyists, foreign policymakers in the US Department of State in Washington, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BFCO) in London who are known for their pro-Arabists views, have characterized North-South conflict as a foreign conspiracy against Sudanese national unity. In fact, all of the above descriptions are unrealistic and could not provide a concrete explanation that truly justifies the causes of a war that has been waged for more than four generations. The main causes of the war are lack of power and resources or wealth sharing, unequal development, denial of access into the political and economic mainstream, forced Arabization and Islamization, slavery, genocide, and cultural assimilation of Africans in the southern part of the country to become ‘black Arabs-Muslims.’ This is clearly a policy of Islamic apartheid, colonial domination and exploitation, and Arab-Muslim racialism and racism in South Sudan. The international community and Sub-Saharan Africa have moral obligations to end expanding Arab-Muslim neo-imperialism and Islamic terrorism in the Africa and beyond.

This prolonged colonial war has cost the South more than 2 million lives, more than 5 million people internally displaced, hundreds of thousands have been forced to flee their homeland to the neighboring countries to become refugees and live a destitute life in over-crowded and filthy refugee camps with no future. Many hundreds of thousands more have been forced to seek resettlement in the Diaspora to seek a new and hard life in strange political cultures. The international media and the international community have failed to respond to the flight of South Sudanese. The international community knew about the war in Sudan but for reasons beyond anyone’s controls and divergent of variant strategic national interests, decided to ignore it, unfortunately. It was only in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City (NYC), the Pentagon in Virginia, and the hijacking of a United Airlines plane flying over Pennsylvania with 300 passengers on board. It was a tragedy that challenged the moral consciousness of the civilized world. It was this moment the international community began to demonstrate some interest in the Sudan conflict. Most importantly, Southerners of the old school should also be blamed for not being straightforward in articulating strongly and appropriately to the international community the reasons for demanding partition and de-colonization as compared to the struggles in Eritrea and East Timor or any other nationalist movements elsewhere in the world.

There has been lack of any strategic, coherent national interest in the South. Therefore, the South has fallen as bait in propagating the war as an Arab-Muslim colonial war, religious extremism, and Islamic apartheid that is not only being waged against South Sudanese, but also Sub-Saharan Africa. To prove this point, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has contributed more than $300billion of its Petro-Dollar revenue for the cause of "Islamic expansionism" and "proselytizing" throughout the non-Muslim nation-states worldwide and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. The current situation in South Sudan would eventually affect Western Europe and the United States who have the fastest growing Muslim population in the world. The Muslims have targeted Europe and North America for future sociopolitical and economic influence.

In retrospect, the current situation in the world with emphasis on international terrorism, jihad, and radical Islamic paradigms was the clear message of Ayatollah Khomeini to the Muslim world was the Islam would expand and conquer the world. The war in Sudan is multifaceted and complex to analyze. It is conceived as a North-South conflict, which involves ethno-cultural fissures between the Arab-Muslim North and the non-Arab-Muslim south. Tribal warfare and its primordial identifications, and politico-economic disparities are also important factors in the analysis of the conflict. This research has been identified by scientific, analytical, and methodological means and identifies the following as main causes of the conflict:

• Gross lack of power sharing

• Under-representation and participation
• Geography, history, culture, language and religion
• Arab-Muslim colonialism in South Sudan
• Lack of trust and confidence building measures and religious extremism

The current situation in Sudan is a legacy of British colonial rule during the scramble for Africa in the 19^th Century. In fact, it was naturally a wrong decision and judgment to have amalgamated two immortal enemies in one heterogeneous state. The British colonial administration knew outright that cultural and racial distinctions are inevitable of what Professor Samuel P. Huntington termed as the "Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order." The Arab-Muslim North, with backing from Egypt and the League of Arab States against the African non-Arab-Muslim South Sudanese, is an issue that the world has ignored and put on the backburner for four decades. The specific Egyptian strategic national security interest is the control of the Nile Waters that it secured under the 1929, 1958, and other subsequent Nile Waters Agreements. As a result, the British colonial administration envisaged creating two separate and distinct administrations. On the one hand, the predominantly Arab-Muslim North was governed in the British pattern of Muslim administration found in Egypt and the Middle East, minus the modern Jewish State of Israel, as the only authentic democratic, economically, and technologically advanced political culture throughout the Middle East. On the other hand, South Sudan was governed through indirect rule or the "Dual Mandates," developed in the Northern Emirates of Nigeria by Lord Henry Luggard in the 1900s, which became the standardized British colonial policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

DEVELOPMENT GAP

Development has multiple definitions. In this work, it shall be defined development as the social, economic, and political structures and processes that enable all members of society to show opportunities for education, employment, civil participation, social and cultural fulfillment as human beings, in the context of fair distribution of the society’s resources among all its citizenry. It could also be defined as "to meet the needs of today’s people without jeopardizing the activity of future generations to meet their needs." This is what is termed as sustainable development. The colonial authorities resisted and refused to allow missionaries to proselytize in the North. They also wanted to keep missionaries out of the South. However, a compromise was reached that allowed missionaries freedom of action in the South. At first, the British were neutral on Arabization and Islamization of the South. However, in 1919-24 an anti-British revolt in Egypt led the British to sever Anglo-Egyptian and Sudan relations impeded the spread of Arab influence into the southern part of the country. They decided to keep the South as a kind of counter-balance to Egyptian and Islamic influence in the North in pursuing a policy of encouraging African identity in southern Sudan.

The British relatively developed the Arab-Muslim north economically and educationally and it kept South Sudan grossly underdeveloped and made it a "Closed District," dividing it up into various spheres of religious influence, extremely undereducated and underdeveloped. In short, the policy of a "Closed District" was to prohibit by law any entrance by foreigners and the Arab-Muslim to have any interaction with citizens of the "Closed District" without proper authorization from the British colonial authorities. By law, it was illegal to enter into any areas declared as "Closed District" and violators were punished with impunity. The status of the "Closed District" in South Sudan was removed in the aftermath of the Second World War in which more than 9,000 troops of the then Sudan Defense Force (SDF) made the greatest ultimate human sacrifice on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government and Allied Forces against Field Marshall Rommel Afrika Corps in the Great Battles in the Libyan-Egyptian Desert of Al-Amin in North Africa. Of course, blatant Eurocentric racial discrimination against the darker skinned people worldwide was the main reason for underdevelopment in South Sudan. Additionally, there was also stiff resistance against the UK colonial policy such as "The Nuer Rebellion"-- the first national liberation movement in South Sudan that was bitterly anti-British colonial rule for more than three decades (1900-1930). As a result, the British colonial administrators were reluctant to provide socioeconomic and educational development in the South. Education and socioeconomic development were entrusted into the hands of the Foreign Missionary Societies (FMS) who were only interested in conversion of Africans to Christianity, but left them undereducated and underdeveloped unfortunately. The development gap remains extremely wide between North and South.

THE CAUSES OF NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT

There is an English adage that goes that "where there is smoke, there is fire." Another African adage laments that "when two elephants fight, it is the grass that gets hurt." No human conflict occurs without a probable cause. The roots of the war in Sudan are multiple. First, it is a war for de-colonization, democratization, freedom, liberty, and political independence through the exercise of the right of self-determination as aptly articulated in President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Principles and the Fourteen Points, with emphasis on Point No. 5 and resolutely accepted by the Charter of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The right of self-determination has two dimensions, external and internal. The external refers to any group of people who have been colonized, occupied, dominated, and/or exploited by a colonial power against their free will and consent, that they have a right to resist the system because it is undemocratic and unjust. As a result, they have the right to create a nation of their own by legal means. Thus, the prolonged armed struggle in South Sudan is unequivocally crystal clear of the desires by the people of South Sudan for total political independence from the Arab-Muslim North colonialism with backing from Egypt and the entire Islamic world. In other words, the armed struggle is aimed at establishing an independent and sovereign state by legal means in South Sudan that would hoist its flag amidst the nations of the world and to become a member state of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

Political historians could not agree more with this demand because it was Mr. Ali Jennah, the founding father of modern Pakistan, who proclaimed that Muslims should have their own state, wherefore they could practice their Islamic religion freely and without hindrance from the predominantly Hindu India. By the same token, the South Sudanese seek to create a secular democratic state to be governed by secular laws with direct demarcation between Church and state rather than being forced to live in a predominantly Islamic state and have been permanently relegated to be second-class citizens in the Arab-Muslim north. As far as South Sudanese are concerned, the demand for the right of self-determination is non-negotiable and shall never again be compromised. It is inevitable that the South would achieve the quest for this fundamental right for statehood by any means necessary. Contrary to the pro-unionist claims expounded by the demonic, autocratic, and authoritarian Marxist-Leninist SPLA leadership, the struggle is for the attainment of "Greater Autonomy," "New Sudan", and the "United Democratic Sudan" which are impractical, unrealistic, euphorically and polemical calculations. In short, the main purpose of the struggle is to eradicate Arab-Muslim colonialism and all its forms

SOUTH-SOUTH DIVISIONS

There are acute South-South divisions based on political and ideological differences, power struggle for leadership, and tribal loyalty and its primordial identifications. The internal divisions have contributed to the split in movement in 1991. Southern nationalism, like Arab-nationalism, is expressed in terms of the "tribe" rather than as a unifying force to enhance the creation of "one united national interest." Thus, South-South nationalism is based on ethnic nationalism and its sub-nationalism and is just as acute as North-South divides. In the South, there is also lack of power, resources or wealth sharing, unequal development, lack of good governance and the rule of law, and the deliberate denial of Southern ethnic nationalities and minorities to have access into politico-economic mainstream. In order to reverse this political trend, it is necessary that the following measures should be considered in promoting democratic governance:

• There should be a need for "positive discrimination" against the majority groups to include minorities to make their contribution in the post-war socio-economic development.
• Strong affirmative action should be implemented to narrow the gap.
• The Transitional National Government (TNG) in the South during the interim period should be decentralized or federated.
• There should be a Transitional Constitution to ensure a system of checks and balances as an alternative to prevent disunity, national disintegration, and interethnic warfare, and the domination of one group by another.
• Post-war socioeconomic development should be equitably distributed and the resources allocated in each region should be utilized for the rapid socio-development including a possible "Marshal Plan" for South Sudan from the industrialized Western countries and the international financial institutions.

Having observed with great interest as an expert the post-war reconstruction and development plan in South Sudan is nil. Moreover, if the plan is what the SPLA and the would-be donors have strategize, it is made up of ‘clusters’ concentrated only in Bhar-el-Ghazel and Bor District, a segment of the Upper Nile with some pockets in Equatoria. The oil rich Nuerland lacks any single project and is treated as a non-entity. This is repetitious of 1972-83 and no educated Nuer would take this for granted any longer. The Nuer nation has fought hard and made big sacrifices and should not be ignored in the post-war development programs. The Nuer nation will make sure that oil wealth shall be used to develop it. The Nuer people, whether they are in the SPLA or not, shall be unanimous on the matter of oil revenue and how it is going to be distributed. Our neighbors will not milk the cow and make us hold the horns of the bull. This is what the Jellabas (Arab-Muslim) did in the South and we shall not allow this to repeat itself. There are two alternatives to readdress this impasse, viz., the Upper Nile will declare itself as a Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) of Greater Upper Nile and shall be autonomous from the South. The three regions in the South now comprising the ten states in the South should form a federal system as opposed to unitary system. The creation of federalism would allow decentralization and bottom up (horizontal) v. top down (pyramidal) decision-making. We emphasize decentralization because it is the only feasible political alternative to achieve equity and to prevent tribal hegemonic tendencies.

Most importantly, we will try to avert the repeat of the post-Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 political developments when Mr. Abel Alier and his Bor-Dinka Mafioso undemocratically monopolized power in 1983 that led to the rise of Kokora (secret society) and the re-divisions of the South into three autonomous regions. For instance, when General El-Nuiemeri appointed Mr. Abel Alier a Bor-Dinka as the Second Vice President of the Republic (nominal position) of the then "United Socialist Sudan" (1969-85) and President of the High Executive Council (HEC) in the South in the aftermath of the Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972, he [Abel] and his Bor-Dinka Mafioso undemocratically monopolized power and exerted Dinka hegemonic tendencies in the South. As a result, the Equatorians became frustrated and resorted to organizing a secret society known as Kokora to lynch the Dinka and other non-Equatorians in Juba town and demanded the unconditional re-division of the South into three autonomous regions. Dr. John Garang of the SPLA, a Bor-Dinka himself has tried hard to repeat the manipulation of Mr. Abel Alier in the movement.

When the dictator Dr. Garang hijacked the movement from its founding fathers, whom he ordered to be assassinated or eliminated after having declared them as "separatists" from within, he swiftly converted what was then a national democratic movement to be a monolithic Dinka Kingdom and hardcore Marxist-Leninist up to this day. He [Garang] did not only monopolize power, but he systematically murdered the best and the brightest or crème de la crème in the South. It would have been difficult to indict the SPLA leadership for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. However, there is now a legal remedy. Under Article 11 of The Sudan Peace Act [HR5531 passed by Congress and signed into law at the White House by President George W. Bush in October 2002. As a consequence of these brutalities, war crimes, human rights abuses, genocide, atrocities, and other heinous crimes committed against humanity by the Marxist-Leninist SPLA, it would be appropriate to refer to Mr. Garang as the prototype of Hitler of the Nazi Germany, Joseph Stalin of the demise former USSR, Pol Pot of Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, and /or the recently deposed despotic and dictator, Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The United States and the UK governments could not afford to install another dictator and tyrannical regime in South Sudan when, in fact, they just got rid of one the worst world’s dictators in Iraq. Should the US and the UK superimpose a dictator only to serve their short and long terms vital national strategic, security, and economic interests, such intent would be a contradiction to the process of promoting democratic governance worldwide and a travesty of social justice promoting liberal democracy.

Furthermore, the consequences for such a dangerous political dream would be a nightmare for the people of South Sudan in the interim and beyond. The Washington, DC "ill-informed" lobbyists on K Street led by Mr. Roger Winter of the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) (now Chief for Disaster Relief at USAID), Mr. John Prendergast, a former Clinton US Department of State official and now a consultant with the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Brussels, Mr. Ted Diagne, an Ethiopian Immigrant at the Congressional Research Center [CRC], and Dr. Francis Mading Deng, who is technically a Northerner or an Arabized Dinka from Abyei, as well as many of the NGOs. Some of the pro-Arabist State Department officials have also joined the bandwagon to openly assert that Mr. Garang is the "George Washington" of South Sudan. On the contrary, it would be trusting to assert that Mr. Garang is the "Benedict Arnold" of South Sudan.

Apart from the above-mentioned actors seeking to plant the seeds of "liberal democracy," it seems they are vying to superimpose a Marxist-Leninist dictator and undemocratic leader to the country. They should have joined hands with other political forces now at work in South Sudan to indict Mr. Garang and his cronies for the war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity they have committed in South Sudan. In the past, however, it was difficult because of lack of precedence to indict the SPLA leadership in the United States, the EU Human Rights Court in Strasbourg, France, or the United Nations International Criminal Court (ICC). The many opportunities and door that have been locked are now unlocked by The Sudan Peace Act, Article 11, to persecute those who killed human beings for the seek of killings.

SOUTH-SOUTH RECONCILIATION

The way to move forward in South Sudan would be based on the implementation of the following paradigms:

• South-South Dialogue should have been a prerequisite before the negotiated peace process.

• To exercise the right of self-determination through an internationally supervised referendum, thus leading to total independence of South Sudan from the Arab-Muslim hegemony. The process in Eritrea in 1993 and in East Timor in 1999 should be appropriate for Sudan's conflict resolution.
• Equitable power and resource sharing. Equal socio-economic and educational development.
• Equitable access for all citizens into the political mainstream. Moreover, the exclusion of any group could trigger a bloody war. There are still unhealed wounds in the hearts of many people who have lost their loved ones because of the SPLA leadership.
• Democratization of the system for equal representation, participation, good governance and rule of law, human rights protection, and transparency and accountability is the only way to go forward in backward and primitive South Sudan. In short, transparent, comprehensive, and inclusive participation of the people in their own government or in the process is required.
• Institutionalization of a flexible federal system of government, good governance and the rule of law.
• Creation of a free market economy (capitalism).
• Adoption of national reconciliation, unity of purpose, and a national unification and integration policy. In other words, de-tribalization as a safeguard to national unity and national integration.
• Equitable representation of women in all hierarchies of the political system. The roles of women should not be ignored in the revolution. South Sudanese women have played great roles as mothers of the revolution and the nation. Hence, they should and ought to be included in any aspects of the country's political process.
• Creation of a Federal Constitution that has "Basic Laws" to protect all citizens’ human rights, social equality for all regardless of creed, national origin, sex, religion, freedom of expression, press, assembly, and other democratic values. The constitutions of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia, Belgium, and the United Kingdom should be studied to promote the seeds of democratization, pluralism or multiculturalism and good governance and the rule of law.
• Immediate and unconditional implementation of a South-South Dialogue for grass-roots reconciliation, repentance, unity of purpose, and of equals for the wrong-doings southerners have committed against each other between 1972-83, and 1983-1991 and thereafter. The Marxist-Leninist SPLA, Mr. Abel Alier and General Joseph Lago leadership should also be indicted for having created inherent frictions and divisions based on ethnic lines in the South for self-glorification and accumulation of wealth for personal gains. Southerners should not fall into the footsteps of the above corrupt, unimaginative, and non-visionary leaders.
• Formation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the post-apartheid era in the Republic of South Africa in South Sudan. This should be the forum for any members of the community who have done wrong to their fellow citizens and publicly confess such inhumane acts. This is important for the process of healing wounds, reconciliation and trust, and building confidence. Without a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the South will be disintegrated and shall never reunite.
• Establishing a United Nations Tribunal similar to Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Iraq to indict, apprehend, and try "evil doers" for having committed genocide, murders, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity in South Sudan. All the warlords and the big fish that have killed for no apparent reason should not get away with their crimes. They must be pursued, apprehended, tried and sentenced for the crimes they have committed against humanity during the war years. Article 11 of the Sudan Peace Act, international humanitarian law and the laws of war should be applied to those who broke them.

THE MACHAKOS PROTOCOL

The ongoing current negotiations under the Machakos Protocol reflect a pro-unionist overture, which is not good for anyone in the South except the Marxist-Leninist SPLA leadership. We strongly recommend that they should be expanded and diversified in order to give room to the overwhelmingly silent majority pro-independence south Sudan from the Arab-Muslim North colonialism and exploitation. The proposed 6-year interim period illustrates the flaws in the much ado about Machakos Protocol, which makes it redundant, impractical, and if not impossible, to achieve peace in North-South debacle. Who will accept a 6-year interim period in the South? Who will accept a peace agreement signed by the SPLA and the NIF regime? Who mandates SPLA as the spokesperson of South Sudan? It should be stated at the outset that in the event that the Marxist-Leninist SPLA and the pro-Islamic NIF regime should sign an agreement, it should constitute a bilateral agreement, and does not address the concerns of the marginalized political forces and armed groups. It should be underscored that any agreement brokered in the Machakos Protocol will not be the "Koran or the Bible." Both the Addis-Ababa of 1972 and the recent Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 have taught Southerners unforgettable lessons that the Arab-Muslim North could not be trusted in keeping its word of honor. The Machakos Protocol is not an agreement, but rather a framework aimed at achieving peaceful and political conflict resolution. The Machakos Protocol has six major flaws:

1. It is not transparent, comprehensive, and inclusive;
2. It lacks coherent and virtual objectives and concrete political aspirations for the South to attain the dream of political independence;
3. It serves as a vehicle or capsule for the Marxist-Leninist SPLA leadership to illegally and undemocratically monopolize power during the proposed 6-year interim period;
4. The IGAD mediators, the international actors (the US, the UK, Norway; and Italy), have completely failed to bring pressure to bear down on the SPLA and the Government of Sudan (GOS) bilateral negotiations to expand it in order to include the excluded overwhelming majority, vis-à-vis, all armed groups, political forces, civil society, and the intellectual community in the South;
5. The IGAD and the international actors should, as a prerequisite, pressure the SPLA to accept unconditionally and without any quid-pro quo the convening of a South-South Dialogue as imperative for reconciliation, reunification, and unity of purpose of the South as a whole. South-South Dialogue would create the immediate transformation and implementation of the institutions of democratization, good governance and the rule of law, human rights protection, transparency and accountability as well as the restoration of civil society destroyed by the SPLA and the GOS in the past 20 years of war in the South; and
6. The proposed 6-year interim period outlined in The Machakos Protocol is for pure propaganda and public relations. Both the SPLA and the GOS are not sincere and honest about peace and they are both unpopular parties in the North and South alike. They both have surmountable problems. The Marxist-Leninist SPLA does not have the mandate to represent the South nor does it have the military muscle to protect any peace in the South.

PEACE PROCESS

The ongoing bilateral peace process between the Marxist-Leninist Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime of Lt. General Hassan Omer Al-Beshir is bound to have many obstacles ahead. First, the process is not transparent, comprehensive, and inclusive. Overwhelmingly, of the population and armed factions in the South who fought equally in the war have deliberately and willfully been excluded. The SPLA itself does not have the military muscles to govern the South or to implement the agreement once it is signed. It could not possibly rely on foreign powers with specific vested national strategic security interests, but the people of South Sudan as a whole. The lobbyists in Washington DC have oversold the SPLA to the Bush Administration as being the "good guy" on the block and the rest are the "bad guys" in South Sudan unfortunately. The political history of the SPLA is full of bloodshed. It has committed murders, massacres, genocide, war crimes, atrocities, and other heinous crimes against humanity since its inception in 1983. It has not been a democratic movement. As a result, the split in August 1991 was based on three basic issues -- lack of concrete objectives in the movement; lack of democratization, good governance and the rule of law; and transparency and accountability. Most importantly, there and still is horrific leadership ability.

Cognizance of the historiography in dishonoring agreements in Sudan, nothing on the face of this Earth could prevent any would-be peace sign by the two autocratic movements at the expense of others would be dismantled. The Arab-Muslim north Islamic regime would sign the peace agreement, but would not implement it and at the end of the day would dishonor it just as with previous peace agreement that failed Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, which out-rightly assured the exercise of the right of self-determination within an interim period of four years. This agreement was fragmented and dishonored in less than two years, though it remains in the books and forms part of the 1998 Sudan Constitution in Articles 137 and 138. Many Northerners would term any peace signing as not a "Qur’aan (Koran)" or "The Bible" as they termed that "The Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 and the Khartoum Peace Agreements were termed as not the Bible or the Qur’aan." Because the NIF and the SPLA are both unpopular in the North and south alike, it is predictable that they could sign a peace agreement but many people in both camps would not honor it. For Southerners, the Marxist-Leninist SPLA would have to come to terms in sharing power with other parties and movements in the South. Because Mr. Garang is unpopular in the South, including his own Bor District, he would have a hell of a time daring to seek political leadership through undemocratic means. Any Southern leadership should underscore that the age of dictatorship is gone forever, and that dictators should be replaced by the process of democratization, partnership, participation, representation, and elections for any leaders vying for public office. In short, the dictatorship of Mr. Abel Alier in the post Addis-Ababa Accord of 1972 and his mafia shall never again be repeated in South Sudan because the people shall envisage that South Sudan shall be federated and the power shall be equitably shared between the federal, state and local governments without any interference into each other's jurisdiction or domain.

NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Many peace agreements have been signed, dissipated, fragmented, dishonored, and now gone with the wind. There is also the likelihood that any eventual bilateral peace agreement signed between the Marxist-Leninist SPLA and the NIF regime could also be dishonored. The Arab-Muslim North is known for not keeping its word of honor. Because the North-South debacle is a colonial war with direct backing from Egypt and the League of Arab States (LAS), the only practical solution is that the South must and ought to reconcile, unite, and speak with one voice in order to be de-colonized from Arab colonialism, imperialism, Islamic apartheid, racism and racialism, and forced Arabization and Islamization. There are ways to achieve de-colonization in the South. The hard way would involve the intensification of the armed struggle and peaceful and political conflict resolution through an internationally supervised referendum with the unity of Sudan and secession of the South as an independent and sovereign state. The SPLA propagates the concept of Greater Autonomy for the South. This demand is contrary to the overwhelmingly Southern public opinion. Because the North is committed to the political philosophy of creating an Islamic state, it would be impractical, if not impossible, for non-Muslims to become part of the perceived Umma Al-Islamiyya. In accordance with Shari ‘a laws, the non-Muslim population may not become part of the Islamic state unless they are converted to Islam through Jihad or voluntarily submitted to Islam.

Another reason for the South to be de-colonized from the North is that every person has the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right, they are free to determine their political destiny, economic, social, and cultural well being as well as the right to develop a great African contribution to the United Nations. In essence, there are two schools of thought in the South – pro-independence school of thought and pro-unionist school of thought. The SPLA is a pro-unionist outfit. The leader of the SPLA has made this point loud and clear since he hijacked the movement from the late charismatic Colonel Gai Tut, the fearless Colonel William Abdallah Chuol Deng, General Gordon Koang Chol, and General Vincent Kuany Lajor. The ongoing bilateral talks between the SPLA and the NIF would not produce peace, but only more chaos because many political forces and the armed groups have been excluded. Both the SPLA and the NIF are unpopular parties. Hence, they seek to forge a partnership to rule the country.

CONCLUSION

The Anglo-American peace initiative is one of the six peace initiatives on the Sudan conflict, namely, the IGAD peace process, the Libyan-Egyptian Initiative (LEI), Eritrean Initiative (EI), Nigerian Initiative (NI), the Multilateral Peace Initiative (MPI) sponsored by the European Union (EU), and the US unilateral peace initiative (The Sudan Peace Act (HR5531). Without a shadow of a doubt, everyone on both sides of the conflict is yearning for peace. However, how to attain the dream of peace is the thorn of the bud. The Arab-Muslim North does have the history of not keeping agreements. What kind of magical power will the Anglo-Americans have? The political historiography of peacemaking in the North-South conflict has shown that many agreements have been brokered, un-implemented, and dishonored at the end. The last peace agreement to be dishonored was the recent Khartoum or Sudan Peace Agreement in 1997.

Now, through Anglo-American initiative, another peace agreement is looming on the horizon through the Machakos Protocol of July 2002. The question that we would be obliged to probe is what kind of peace process do we anticipate in 2004? How credible are the Marxist-Leninist SPLA and pro-Islamic NIG regimes in the peacemaking process? What have we learned from the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997? Has the NIF regime scrapped the KPA from the books? Will the Machakos Protocol bring peace to war-ravaged Sudan? We need to wait for the results of the Anglo-American peace initiative to answer these questions. Both the Marxist-Leninist SPLA and the Pro-Islamic regime in Sudan should know that they have a moral responsibility to stop the bloodshed and the people of South Sudan and the world are diligently watching them! The US should understand that both Garang and Beshir have many things in common. For instance, they are both dictators of the worst kind. They both served in the Sudanese army. They both have killed many people on both sides of the warring camps just to maintain power. The people of Sudan would like to have the commitment from the US that the two dictators and their crones should not be able to exclude anyone from participating in the political process. The south has been divided by tribal, political, and ideological differences; hence, there is a greater need for dialogue for reconciliation, forgiveness, and unity of purpose and equals. If there is any failure on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom in providing safeguards to any agreement and democratic federal constitution in the south, the possibility of derailing peace are greater than ever ©David Chand 2004.